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THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF FEDERALISM:
THE SUPREME COURT REJECTS NATIONAL
LEAGUE OF CITIES AND AFFIRMATIVE
STATE RIGHTS IN GARCIA v. SAN
ANTONIO METROPOLITAN TRANSIT AUTHORITY
I. INTRODUCTION
Federalism' remains one of the most troublesome issues for the
United States Supreme Court, which has reversed its position several
times. The major debate concerns whether the Constitution contains
an express or implied affirmative limit on the power of the federal gov-
ernment over the states.3
In 1976 the Supreme Court declared in National League of Cities v.
Usery4 that the tenth amendment 5 places an affirmative limit on Con-
gress' commerce power 6 as applied to the states. The Court stated that
this restraint renders states immune from federal commerce power reg-
ulations that displace a state's ability to structure "integral operations"
of "traditional governmental functions.",7
After attempting to apply this test in several subsequent cases,8 the
Court recently overruled National League of Cities in Garcia v. San
1. Federalism is defined by one source as a "[tierm which includes interrelation-
ships among the states and the relationship between the states and the federal govern-
ment." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 551 (5th ed. 1979).
2. See infra notes 24-91 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 24-38 and accompanying text.
4. 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (holding the wage and hour provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA) inapplicable to state and local governments).
5. U.S. CONsT. amend. X. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people." Id.
6. U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 3. "Congress shall have the Power. . .[t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes .. " Id.
7. See infra notes 36-46 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 42-81 and accompanying text.
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Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.9
II. BACKGROUND OF GARCIA
In Garcia, the San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority
(SAMTA) sought a declaratory judgment acknowledging that it was
exempt from the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA)' ° because of its status as a public mass transit authority."' The
district court granted SAMTA's motion for declaratory relief.2 The
Supreme Court subsequently remanded"3 the case to the district court
in light of the Court's decision in United Transportation Union v, Long
Island Railroad Co. 14 In Long Island Railroad, the Court held that a
state-owned commuter railroad did not qualify for state immunity be-
cause it did not undertake a "traditional" governmental function.15
The district court distinguished Long Island Railroad on remand and
held SAMTA 16 immune from the FLSA overtime provisions. 7 It
cited the long history of state and local regulation of mass transit for
the conclusion that mass transit is a "traditional" function and dis-
counted the federal interest in transit wages because Congress did not
attempt to regulate such wages until 1966.18
On direct appeal, 9 the Supreme Court reversed in a sharply divided
decision.20 Justice Blackmum authored a broad, stinging attack upon
the wisdom and viability of the National League of Cities doctrine,
which he had supported in 1976.21 The Justice concluded that states
are protected adequately by the political process and by the fact that
9. 53 U.S.L.W. 4135 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1985) (upholding FLSA overtime provisions
against public mass transit authority).
10. See infra note 34 and accompanying text.
11. 53 U.S.L.W. at 4136.
12. Id. at 4137.
13. 457 U.S. 1102 (1982).
14. 455 U.S. 678 (1982) (state-owned commuter railroad not immune from federal
labor laws because it was not a "traditional" governmental function).
15. Id.
16. San Antonio'Metropolitan Transit Auth. v. Donovan, 557 F. Supp. 445 (W.D.
Tex. 1983).
17. Id. at 453.
18. Id. at 447-50.
19. See infra note 60.
20. 53 U.S.L.W. 4135 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1985).
21. See infra note 66 and text accompanying note 39.
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the federal government can exercise only those powers enumerated in
the Constitution.22
III. HISTORY OF COMMERCE POWER LIMITATIONS
To appreciate the impact of this pronouncement on federalism prin-
ciples, one must examine the convoluted history of the scope of the
commerce power 23 as interpreted by the Supreme Court.
In drafting the Constitution, the framers intended the commerce
clause to alleviate restrictive trade regulations among the states by vest-
ing a central authority with power to regulate commerce.24 Other con-
stitutional provisions only limit Congress' power to regulate interstate
commerce. 25 The tenth amendment2 6 presents one such potential limi-
tation. The Supreme Court, however, has never clearly established the
scope of the tenth amendment limitation with any consistency. Ini-
tially, the Court interpreted the tenth amendment to protect the exclu-
sive power of states to regulate local activities.27 This concept
gradually eroded28 until the Court in United States v. Darby2 9 found no
22. 53 U.S.L.W. at 4140-42.
23. See supra note 6 for the text of the commerce clause.
24. See H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 533-34 (1949) (explain-
ing the origins and purposes of the commerce clause); see generally G. GUNTHER,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 113 (1980) (brief summary of
commerce clause background, impact, and uses). For the text of the commerce clause,
see supra note 6.
25. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (establishing the parameters
of the commerce power).
26. See supra note 5.
27. The early Court asserted that states possessed the exclusive right to regulate
local concerns, including activities which occurred before or after interstate commerce.
See United States v. Knight, 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (manufacturing is not commerce, and
thus is beyond reach of the commerce power); Oliver Iron v. Lord, 262 U.S. 172 (1923)
(mining is not commerce); Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)
(federal regulation of sales after completion of interstate transportation exceeds com-
merce power). But see Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495 (1922) (stockyards are com-
merce). In some instances, the Court held that the tenth amendment offered no
protection for activities which directly affected interstate commerce. See, e.g., Houston
E. & W. Tex. Ry. v. United States (The Shreveport Rate Case), 234 U.S. 342 (1914)
(held that discounted rates for intrastate, but not interstate, railroad routes directly af-
fected interstate commerce). See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG,
HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 128-50 (1978) (detailed analysis of the early
development of the commerce power) [hereinafter cited as HANDBOOK].
28. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), where the
Court disregarded the distinction between production and commerce in upholding the
National Labor Relations Act. Instead, the Court declared that intrastate activities
1985]
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commerce power limitation whatsoever in the tenth amendment.30
The Darby Court held that even purely intrastate activities fall within
the commerce power if they affect interstate commerce. 31
Congress used its commerce power liberally and enjoyed full support
from the judiciary32 until the Supreme Court's decision in National
League of Cities v. Usery.33 In National League of Cities, the Court
held the wage and hour provisions of the Fair Labor Standard Act
unconstitutional as applied to state and local governments. 34 In a four-
one-four plurality decision, the Court rediscovered an affirmative limit
on the commerce power within the tenth amendment.35 Justice Rehn-
quist, writing for the plurality, concluded that when Congress uses the
commerce power to regulate states as states, it cannot interfere directly
with a state's power to structure "integral operations" in areas of
which bore a "close and substantial" relation to interstate commerce fell within the
reach of the commerce power. Id. at 37. Beginning with this case and until National
League of Cities, the Court stopped defining the commerce power limits in terms of
tenth amendment reserved power. HANDBOOK, supra note 31, at 151.
29. 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (upholding the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1936).
30. Id. at i24. The Darby Court dismissed the tenth amendment as a truism. Id.
31. Id. The affecting commerce rationale first appeared in Jones & Laughlin, 301
U.S. 1 (1937).
32. The only additional modification to the commerce power doctrine prior to Na-
tional League of Cities came in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). In Wickard,
the Court held that farm production for private and local consumption was within the
purview of the commerce clause because of the aggregate cumulative effects of such
activities. Id. See also HANDBOOK, supra note 31, at 154.
33. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
34. Id. at 852. The Court struck down the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, 88 Stat. 55 (1976) (amending 29 U.S.C. §§ 202-08, 210, 212-
14, 216, 255, 260, 630, 634 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 1974 FLSA Amendments]. The
1974 FLSA Amendments extended coverage of the acts they amended to state and local
governments. Striking down the 1974 FLSA amendments, the Court expressly over-
ruled Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968), which upheld a FLSA amendment ex-
tending coverage of the Act to state and local government employees in transit, health
care, and education. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. 833, 855 (1976).
35. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. 833, 843 (1976). "The [tenth] amendment
declares the constitutional policy that Congress may not exercise power in a fashion
that impairs the States' integrity or their ability to function effectively a federal system."
Id. (quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975)). Some commentators
questioned whether the tenth amendment was the source of this state sovereignty limita-
tion because the above passage is the only explicit reference to the tenth amendment in
Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion. See, eg., Michelman, States' Rights and States'
Role: Permutations of'Sovereignty'in National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE. L.J.
1165, 1173-74 (1977).
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"traditional government functions."36 The Court, however, stated that
Congress may invade even this area if a compelling federal interest out-
weighed the intrusion.37 The plurality reasoned that states must be
free to perform those functions which are "essential attributes of state
sovereignty," including the power to structure employer-employee
relationships.38
Justice Blackmun, writing separately, conditioned his concurrence
upon an understanding that the plurality adopted a balancing approach
which considered the relative federal and state interests.3 9 In a dissent-
ing opinion, Justice Brennan argued that the plurality usurped the role
of the legislature and ignored an unbroken line of precedent.' Justice
Stevens, dissenting separately, asserted that a state's governmental ac-
36. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852. As an example of protected integral
government functions, the Court cited a state's ability to structure employer-employee
relationships. Id. at 851. The Court revived a distinction between regulation of state
governmental activities (states as states) and regulation of state proprietary activities.
Ironically, this distinction was rejected by the Court 30 years earlier as an unworkable
test. New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 582-83 (1946).
37. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 853. The Court harmonized its decision
with Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975) (upholding application of a wage freeze
to state governments). It noted that the limits of the commerce power do not preclude
temporary emergency federal enactments. 426 U.S. at 853.
38. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 851-52. Commentators criticized the
National League of Cities Court for its failure to elucidate the test in anything but am-
biguous, undefined language. See, e.g., Note, National League of Cities v. Usery, Its
Implications for the Equal Pay Act and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 10
U. MICH. J.L. REF. 239, 248-58 (1977) (discussion of the ambiguities in National
League of Cities, including the failure of the Court to specify by category rather than by
example the protected state functions, the failure to define or distinguish traditional and
essential state functions, and the unexplained governmental/proprietary activity distinc-
tion); Gelfand, The Burger Court and the New Federalism: Preliminary Reflections on
the Roles of Local Government Actors in the Political Dramas of the 1980's, 21 B.C.L.
REv. 763, 812-15 (1980) (critical of the Court's failure to specify the protected state
activities); Note, The Constitutionality of the ADEA After Usery, 30 ARK. L. REV. 363,
366-68 (arguing that the Court failed to explain exactly what burdens are permissible,
and noting the conflict between the direct interference test of the plurality and the bal-
ancing test of the concurrence). These ambiguities led commentators to develop unique
theories about the case. See, e.g., Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New
Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 HARV. L. REv.
1065 (1977) (positing that the Court recognized affirmative rights of citizens to basic
governmental services traditionally provided by states). But see La Pierre, The Political
Safeguards of Federalism Redux: Intergovernmental Immunity and the States as Agents
of the Nation, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 779, 961-77 (1982) (criticizing Tribe's theory and eval-
uating other theories spawned by National League of Cities).
39 National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
40. Id. at 867 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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tivities are subject to federal regulation and that state interests are pro-
tected adequately by the political process. 4
In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association,"2
the Court restructured the National League of Cities criteria into a
"three prong plus balancing" test. Under Hodel, to violate the tenth
amendment, the challenged statute must first regulate states directly.43
Next, the statute must address subjects that are unquestionably attrib-
utes of state sovereignty.' The third prong requires that compliance
with the federal statute must directly interfere with a state's freedom to
structure "integral operations" in areas of "traditional functions."' 45
Even if these criteria are satisfied, a challenge succeeds only if a balanc-
mng test shows that the federal interest does not justify state
submission.46
Lower courts subsequently applied this test inconsistently,47 par-
tially because of the failure of the Court in both National League of
Cities and Hodel to define adequately the terms used in the test.48
Many lower courts ignored the vague three-prong test and instead con-
centrated on the balancing approach.49 The Supreme Court, however,
adhered to its criteria until Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v.
Mississippi.5 ° In Mississippi, the Court upheld the Public Utility Regu-
41. Id. at 880 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
42. 452 U.S. 264 (1981). The Bodel Court held valid under the commerce clause
the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977. Under the Act, states must
comply with federal regulations concerning coal mining standards and land reclama-
tion. Otherwise, the states must allow the federal government to manage and finance
such a program. Because the Act did not compel state regulation or expenditures and
only regulated private activity, the Court upheld it. Id. at 288.
43. 452 U.S. at 287. The sovereignty challenge in Hodel broke down at this first
step. See supra note 42.
44. 426 U.S. at 287-88.
45. Id. at 288 (quoting National League of Cities).
46. Id. at 288 n.29.
47. Compare Kenny v. Board of Trustees of Valley County School Dist., 543 F.
Supp. 1194, 1197-99 (D. Mont. 1982) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act ADEA
sustained using Hodel three-prong test) with Usery v. Board of Educ. of Salt Lake City,
421 F. Supp. 718, 719-20 (D. Utah 1976) (ADEA sustained using balancing test) and
EEOC v. Elrod, 674 F.2d 701, 711-12 (1982) (ADEA sustained using direct impact test
and balancing test).
48. See supra note 38.
49. See, eg., Peel v. Florida Dep't of Transp., 600 F.2d 1070 (6th Cir. 1979) (up-
holding Veterans Reemployment Rights Act as applied to states); Usery v. Board of
Educ. of Salt Lake City, 421 F. Supp. 718 (D. Utah 1976).
50. 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
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latory Policies Act of 1978 against a state sovereignty challenge. In-
stead of invoking the Hodel test, the Court used a rational basis test
because it found no appreciable burden on the state or impairment of
the state's ability to function as a sovereign.51 The Court emphasized
that the federal enactment merely set standards for state control of the
otherwise preemptible field of utility regulation.52
One year later, the Court attempted to apply the National League of
Cities test for the final time in EEOC v. Wyoming. 3 Wyoming
stemmed from the involuntary retirement of a Wyoming Game and
Fish Department supervisor at age fifty-five.54 A state statute made
continued employment of game wardens fifty-five years of age or older
contingent upon employer approval.55 The retired supervisor filed a
complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC),56 which brought suit against the State of Wyoming for viola-
tion of the Age Discrimation in Employment Act (ADEA).57 On de-
fendant's motion, the district court dismissed the case and held that
51. Id. at 755-60. Under the rational basis test, the Court validates federal legisla-
tion when there is a rational basis for Congress' finding that the regulated activity af-
fects interstate commerce. Id. at 758.
52. Id. at 746-47. The Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 requires states
to consider six approaches to structuring utility rates. This requirement was the most
intrusive portion of the challenged Act. The majority held that electricity is a proper
subject for interstate commerce regulation, since no state relies solely upon its own
resources for electricity. Id. at 756-57. Furthermore, since the challenged regulations
did not set standards for state sovereign powers or compel their exercise, the statute did
not regulate states directly. Thus, the Court may have implicitly found that the chal-
lenge failed the first prong of the Hodel test. Id. at 765.
53. 460 U.S. 226 (1983).
54. The district court found that the supervisor was a law enforcement officer, not
merely an administrative employee. Thus, he fell within the scope of the Wyoming
mandatory retirement statute. EEOC v. Wyoming, 514 F. Supp. 595, 597 (D. Wyo.
1981), rev'd, 460 U.S. 226 (1983).
55. The Wyoming State Highway Patrol and Game and Fish Warden Retirement
Act, Wyo. Stat. § 31-3-107(c) (1977 & Supp. 1984). The Act states that "[a]n employee
may continue in service on a year-to-year basis after age ... fifty-five (55), with the
approval of the employer and under conditions as the employer may prescribe." Id.
56. Congress created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to enforce the provisions of that Act related to unlawful
discriminatory employment practices. See 43 U.S.C. § 2000-e4 (1982).
57. Pub. L. No. 90-202, 1 Stat. 602 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634
(1982)). The ADEA of 1967 was designed both to promote employment of older per-
sons based on ability and to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment. The
statute includes provisions that forbid age discrimination in employment compensation,
terms, conditions, and privileges. Id. § 623. It specifically prohibits refusal to hire an
19851
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Congress exceeded the tenth amendment5" limit on its commerce
power by applying the ADEA to state law enforcement personnel.5 9
The EEOC appealed directly' ° to the Supreme Court, which reversed
the district court decision. 61
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority in Wyoming, first stated
that the National League of Cities immunity doctrine was designed
only to ensure the independence of states in a federal system.62 He
then reiterated the Hodel three-prong test for impermissible federal
commerce power intrusions. 63 Applying the facts to the test, the ma-
jority found that the statute directly regulated states as states, therefore
Wyoming satisfied the first inquiry.f' The Court, however, failed to
consider the second prong: whether the ADEA amendment prohibit-
ing state age discrimination in employment addressed an indisputable
attribute of state sovereignty. The Court found that determination un-
necessary because it concluded that the challenge failed the third prong
of the Hodel test, in that the amendment did not impair Wyoming's
ability to structure integral operations for traditional functions.
6
individual because of his age. Id. § 623(a). Its provisions, however, apply only to per-
sons 40 to 70 years of age. Id. § 631.
Seven years after the ADEA's passage, Congress amended the Act to include state
and local government employees. The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-259, 88 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1982)). Congress en-
larged the definition of "employer" to include state and local governments. See id.
According to one Supreme Court Justice, 29 states had mandatory retirement laws
for certain state employees (usually law enforcement personnel and firefighters) as of
March 1983. EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 253-54 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
58. .See supra note 5 for the language of the tenth amendment.
59. EEOC v. Wyoming, 514 F. Supp. 595 (D. Wyo. 1981), rev'd, 460 U.S. 226
(1983).
60. See 28 U.S.C. § 2152 (1982) (provides that "[a]ny party may appeal to the
Supreme Court from an interlocutory or final judgment. . . of any court of the United
States. . . holding an Act of Congress unconstitutional in any civil suit. . . to which
the United States or any of its agencies. . . is a party").
61. 460 U.S. 226 (1983). Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens joined
Justice Brennan's majority opinion, and Justice Stevens added a separate concurrence.
Chief Justice Burger wrote a dissenting opinion adopted by Justices Powell, Rehnquist,
and O'Connor. Justice Powell added a separate dissent which Justice O'Connor joined.
62. Id. at 236. The Court, however, denied that the National League of Cities im-
munity doctrine was intended to create a sacred province of state autonomy. Id.
63. Id. at 237 (quoting Hodel, 452 U.S. at 287-88).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 238-39. Regarding the second part of the Hodel test, the Court conceded
that the meaning of an "undoubted attribute of state sovereignty" remained unclear.
Id. at 238, n.11. The majority found that the challenge failed part three of the test,
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol28/iss1/14
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Carefully distinguishing National League of Cities by the degree of
federal intrusion,66 the Court stressed the bona fide occupational quali-
fication (BFOQ)67 and individual assessment 68 exceptions to the
ADEA. It also found no conclusive evidence that compliance with the
statute drains state budgets.69 In addition, the Court implied that the
ADEA amendment could be upheld under either the balancing test7"
or section five of the fourteenth amendment.7 '
In his dissent, Chief Justice Burger asserted that the Constitution
does not authorize the federal government to set detailed standards for
the selection of state employees, including those charged with law en-
forcement.72 He found all the requisite elements of the three-prong
though it noted that the National League of Cities Court mentioned the management of
state parks as an example of a "traditional" governmental function. Id. at 239.
66. Id. at 239-42. The Court concluded that the threat to Wyoming's independence
was less serious than the threat to states posed in National League of Cities. Id.
The Court apparently misapplied the third prong of the National League of Cities
test, which requires that the federal statute directly impair a state's power to structure
"integral" operations. The majority in Wyoming considered neither the directness of
the impairment nor the type of state activity invaded. Instead, the Court compared the
degree of federal intrusion with the intrusion in National League of Cities, and then
balanced the intrusion against the federal interests at stake. Id.
One likely explanation lies with Justice Blackmun, who sided with the states in Na-
tional League of Cities on the express understanding that the plurality adopted a balanc-
ing of interests approach. See supra text accompanying note 39. In Wyoming, Justice
Blackmun switched to the federal government's side and the balancing became evident.
Justice Blackmun's defection from the National League of Cities state sovereignty doc-
trine ultimately manifested itself in his majority opinion in Garcia. See infra notes 82-
91 and accompanying text.
67. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1982). This statute provides an ADEA exception when
age is an occupational qualification necessary for the normal operation of a business or
when the distinction stems from reasonable factors besides age. Id.
68. 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(3) (1982). Congress allows discharges or other actions for
good cause to be taken without violating the ADEA. Id.
69. 460 U.S. at 241. The Court contended that other factors may outweigh the
"largely speculative" cost increases from higher salaries and higher retirement benefits
for older workers. These factors include delayed pension benefits, longer contributions
into the pension fund, and shorter benefit payments after delayed retirement. Id.
70. Id. at 242-43 n. 17. The Court stated that the "minimal character of the federal
intrusion," measured against the "well defined federal interest" addressed in the legisla-
tion, might require a finding that the nature of the interest justifies state submission. Id.
71. Id. at 243-44 n.18. In reaffirming that a proper exercise of the fourteenth
amendment enforcement power is immune from tenth amendment constraints, the
Court also restated that Congress' power is not restricted by its recitals of authority. Id.
72. Id. at 251 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
19851
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Hodel test satisfied.73 First, he agreed with the majority that the stat-
ute regulated states as states.74 Unlike the majority, however, the
Chief Justice concluded that the selection of state employees is an attri-
bute of state sovereignty." Finally, he determined that Wyoming met
the last prong of the test because compliance with the statute directly
impaired the state's freedom to structure integral operations in the
traditional area of state park management.76 States, he argued, must
now face higher employment costs because older workers generally
earn more than younger workers.77 In addition, states must cope with
the problems of impeded promotion opportunities and limitations on
states' ability to hire the most physically fit game wardens.7 8 He noted
that the exceptions cited by the majority require states to divert re-
sources to prove a BFOQ under a rigorous standard 79 or to make and
defend individual assessments of all affected employees.80 By applying
the balancing test, Chief Justice Burger argued that the state's interest
in structuring its employment to meet local needs exceeded any federal
interest at stake.81
73. Id. at 252-56.
74. Id. at 252.
75. Id. at 253-54.
76. Id. at 255-56.
77. Id. at 255.
78. Id. at 256.
79. Id. at 257-58. See supra note 67 and accompanying text for the substance of the
bona fide occupational qualification exception. Because this exception contains no
guidelines, courts developed divergent standards. The stricter test requires that a
BFOQ based on age must be reasonably necessary to the essence of the business. In
addition, the employer must reasonably believe that all or substantially all of the per-
sons in the class could not safely or efficiently perform the required duties, or that indi-
vidual assessments would be impractical. Arritt v. Griswell, 567 F.2d 1267, 1271 (4th
Cir. 1977) (quoting Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976)).
Courts most frequently adopt this lest. See, eg., Campbell v. Connelie, 542 F. Supp.
275, 279 (N.D. N.Y. 1982) (age not a BFOQ for state troopers); Johnson v. Mayor and
City of Baltimore, 515 F. Supp. 1287, 1296 (D. Md. 1981) (age not a BFOQ for
firefighters). Other courts accept a BFOQ claim where elimination of the discrimina-
tory hiring practice increases the risk of harm to people. See Hodgson v. Greyhound
Lines, 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974) (upholding age requirement for bus drivers). Yet
another standard demands a factual basis for the belief either that substantially all older
employees cannot safely and efficiently do the job, or that some of them cannot, because
of traits not ascertainable by other standards. See EEOC v. City of St. Paul, 671 F.2d
1162, 1166 (8th Cir. 1982) (age as a BFOQ for firefighters).
80. See supra note 68.
81. 460 U.S. at 259, 264-65. Like the district court, Chief Justice Burger observed
that Congress created large exceptions to the ADEA for certain federal employees still
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol28/iss1/14
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Wyoming illustrates the ambiguities inherent in the National League
of Cities standards, ambiguities that persisted throughout the nine year
life of the National League of Cities doctrine. Thus, the Garcia Court
confronted a doctrine that was no more refined in 1985 than it had
been in 1976.
IV. GARCIA
Justice Blackmun, writing for the five member majority in Garcia,82
stated that the present controversy centers upon whether mass transit
qualifies as a traditional function under the Hodel test. 3 Citing the
lack of consistency in the federal courts' attempts to apply the "tradi-
tional function" standard, he noted that the Court has made little pro-
gress in defining the scope of the protected activities.8 4 Furthermore,
Justice Blackmun contended that a nonhistorical standard for selecting
protected functions would also tend to be unworkable because any
functional standard "inevitably invites an unelected federal judiciary to
make decisions about which state policies it favors and which it
dislikes." 5
Broadly attacking the theoretical underpinnings of National League
of Cities, Justice Blackmun announced that the case was overruled as
"unsound in principle and unworkable in practice."8 6 States retain
sovereignty only to the extent that the Constitution has not divested
them of their powers and transferred such powers to the federal gov-
ernment.8 7 According to Justice Blackmun and the majority, the fram-
ers intended that the structure of the federal government itself would
provide the principal means to ensure the role of the states in the fed-
eral system."8 Justice Blackmun relied heavily on the fact that the
states play a significant role in the political process, and suggested that
subjected to mandatory retirement laws. Id. See 10 U.S.C. § 1251 (1982) (Armed Ser-
vice employees); 22 U.S.C. § 4052 (1982) (Foreign Service employees).
82. 53 U.S.L.W. 4135 (Feb. 19, 1985). Justice Blackmun was joined by Justices
Brennan, White, Marshall, and Stevens. Justice Powell submitted a dissenting opinion
joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor. Justice Rehn-
quist also filed a separate dissent, as did Justice O'Connor, who was joined by Justices
Powell and Rehnquist.
83. Id. at 4137.
84. Id. at 4138.
85. Id. at 4139, 4140.
86. Id. at 4140.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 4141.
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states can protect themselves adequately in the political arena.89 The
constitutional limits on the commerce power are limits of process, not
limits of result.90
Nevertheless, the majority left the door open for potential judicial
intervention by quoting language from Wyoming, stating that substan-
tive restraints on the commerce clause must be justified procedurally
and tailored to compensate for possible failings in the political
process. 91
In a bitter dissent joined by three other Justices,92 Justice Powell
charged the majority with undermining the stability of judicial deci-
sionmaking, abdicating the role of the judiciary in the federal system,
and reducing the tenth amendment to meaningless rhetoric. 9 Every
member of the Court, he stated, joined opinions in which the principles
of National League of Cities were reiterated consistently.94 By making
federal political officials the sole judges of the limits of their own (com-
merce) power, the Court violates fundamental constitutional princi-
ples. Among these principles is the duty of the judiciary to "say what
the law is," which has been recognized since Marbury v. Madison."
According to Justice Powell, the fact that Congress generally does not
exceed its authority to regulate the states does not make judicial review
less necessary when Congress does overstep its powers. The Justice
stated that the role of the states in our governmental system "is a mat-
ter of Constitutional law, not of legislative grace," 96 and he chastised
the "unelected" majority of the Court for rejecting "almost two hun-
dred years of understanding of the constitutional status of
federalism." 97
Justice Powell also questioned the majority's argument that states
are protected poltically because the federal legislature is composed of
representatives from the states. Once in office, the Justice noted, mem-
89. Id. at 4142. "The political process ensures that laws that unduly burden the
states will not be promulgated." Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. (quoting Wyoming, 460 U.S. at 236).
92. See supra note 82.
93. 53 U.S.L.W. at 4143.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 4145 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 4144.
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bers of Congress become members of the federal government.9 8 He
claimed that the majority's analysis is indistinguishable in principle
from a statement that individual rights are amply protected by the
political process because Congress is composed of individuals. 9 Jus-
tice Powell concluded that the majority view was both incorrect and
unjustifiably overbroad in resolving the narrow issue before the Court:
the applicability of the FSLA overtime provisions to a local public
transit authority." °
Justice Rehnquist submitted a brief separate dissent in which he
claimed the judgment of the district court should be affirmed under any
balancing approach. He also expressed confidence that the principles
of National League of Cities will regain the support of a majority of the
Court. 10
1
Justice O'Connor added a separate dissent.1"2 She accused the ma-
jority of irresponsibly retreating from the principles of federalism
rather than attempting to reconcile the dual constitutional concerns of
federalism and an effective commerce power.10 3 The true essence of
federalism, she argued, lies in the legitimate interests of states as states,
which the national government is bound to respect. 1° 4 Justice
O'Connor claimed that the framers envisioned a republic with vitality
assured by diffusion of power among the branches of government and
between the federal government and the states.10 5 As the nation be-
came more interdependent, the commerce power expanded to encom-
pass any activity that affects interstate commerce.' 0 6 Therefore, every
state activity is now vulnerable. 107 In addition, the Court consistently
has made state autonomy a relevant factor in assessing congressional
action.' 0 8 Consequently, the Court must enforce affirmative limits on
federal regulation of the states to complement the judicially expanded
98. Id. at 4145.
99. Id. at 4145 n.8.
100. Id. at 4148-49.
101. Id. at 4149.
102. Id. at 4149-51.
103. Id. at 4149, 4151.
104. Id. at 4149.
105. Id.
106. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
107. 53 U.S.L.W. at 4150.
108. Id. at 4150-51.
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commerce power. 109
V. ANALYSIS
Garcia stands as a very important, yet unusual, federalism decision.
Its importance lies in the "creation" of an entirely new framework for
protection of states' rights. Under this "political process" framework,
states must pursue their political remedies to protect their parochial
interests1 ° Judicial remedies are not available to the states, unless
perhaps a state can show a breakdown of the political process. 11
Garcia also is important because it demonstrates that the Court is
willing to discard its own standards when they prove unmanageable,
even if it means overruling recent consistently applied precedent. 12
The case demonstrates that the Court is capable of self-restraint when
it becomes evident that the judiciary is unable to formulate proper and
predictable standards for invoking a remedy. It also may signify a
limit to the Court's unwillingness to find implied rights in the
Constitution.
In some respects, the Garcia decision is unusual. First, the decision
contains both liberal and conservative elements. Although the Court's
composition has become more conservative and current conservative
thought favors decentralization, the decision favors the centralized fed-
eral government. Nevertheless, Garcia may convey the positive signal
to conservatives that the Court is willing to assume a more passive role
and allow the political process to function in an unencumbered
manner.
In addition, Justice Blackmun's majority opinion overrules a deci-
sion that he previously supported-National League of Cities-which
in turn overruled another recent precedent-Maryland v. Wirtz. 113
The majority opinion discusses neither the tenth amendment nor the
precise issue of whether transit authorities should be subjected to the
labor standards of the FLSA.
Garcia may enjoy only a short lifespan. The Court remains sharply
divided and future appointments to the Court will reveal whether the
109. Id. at 4151.
110. See supra text accompanying notes 82-91.
111. See supra text accompanying note 91.
112. See supra text accompanying notes 50, 62-63, 94.
113. 392 U.S. 183 (1968) (upholding extension of FLSA standards to state and local
government employees in transit, health care and education).
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"affirmative states' rights" faction regains control. Given the likeli-
hood that President Reagan will have an opportunity to appoint con-
servative Justices, it seems probable that states' rights will not be left
entirely in the political arena for very long.
Before the Court overrules Garcia, however, it must formulate clear
and workable standards that define the scope of state rights. The
Court should not revive the National League of Cities standard because
it is neither predictable nor easily applied." 4 Instead, a new test is in
order. This test, above all, must lend itself to easy application and pre-
dictable outcomes. Otherwise Congress, the states, and the courts will
not understand the rules of the game, and the resulting confusion may
inspire yet another precedent-upsetting decision.
Stephen J. Horace
114. See supra notes 38, 47-49 and accompanying text.
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